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INTRODUCTION

This article addresses some of the issues raised in the hypothetical that
formed the focus of the discussion at the Florida Journal of International

Law's Fourth Annual International Business Symposium.' At the outset, a
number of general points need to be made regarding the structure of company
law2 in the United Kingdom.3 A central principle of English company law
is ease of access to the corporate form. It is both cheap and administratively
simple to incorporate a company. Many companies are formed as what are
referred to as "shelf-companies." These companies are incorporated for no
specific, identifiable purpose at the time of their incorporation but can be
taken "off the shelf' when the need arises.' Once incorporated, the Registrar
* Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law, Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford.
1. The hypothetical for the Fourth Annual International Business Symposium can be
found in Volume 10 Number 2 of the FloridaJournalof InternationalLaw.
2. In the United Kingdom, the word "corporation" is not normally used to describe
commercial trading entities. The word company is used to describe what in the United States
is a corporation.
3. There are three separate jurisdictions within the United Kingdom: England and
Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. A company can be registered in only one of these
separate jurisdictions (multiple registration is not possible), and although there are differences
between the company law systems of each, these differences are not relevant for purposes of
this article.
4. Shelf-companies are regularly incorporated by large law firms, and there are
incorporation agents who have a supply of shelf-companies available for purchase. The extent
of this phenomenon is not known. For a very rough guess, see Simon Goulding, The Private
Company in the United Kingdom, in THE EUROPEAN PRiVATE COMPANY? 55, 58 (Harm-Jan
De Kluiver & Walter Van Gerven eds., 1995). The authorities who regulate incorporation also
approve of this practice since it does not result in sudden surges in demand for incorporation
(e.g., at the end of the tax year), such demands being met by the purchase of shelf-companies
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of Companies' certificate of registration is considered conclusive evidence
that, with respect to incorporation, the requirements of the 1985 Companies
Act have been complied with.5 There is no doctrine of defective incorporation; therefore, the company provides a secure legal form for carrying on
business.
Not only is there ease of access to the corporate form, but also in certain
circumstances, parties are required to carry on business in corporate form.
Section 716 of the 1985 Companies Act provides that "[n]o ...partnership
consisting of more than 20 persons shall be formed for the purpose of
carrying on business ... unless it is registered as a company."'6 There are
no quality controls placed on the granting of corporate status. In other
words, there are no minimum standards of financial or commercial viability
that must be satisfied before corporate status can be conferred.7 An example
of such a threshold requirement would be a minimum capitalization
requirement, a requirement common in Continental European jurisdictions!
Lastly, as we shall see when we examine the decision of House of Lords in
Salomon v. Salomon & Co., Ltd.,9 English law has recognized the "one-man"
company since the end of the nineteenth century. 0 This background picture
demonstrates that not only is the company understandably an attractive
commercial vehicle but also that legislative policy dictates that it should
perform such a role.

from incorporation agents.
5. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 1, § 13(7)(a) (Eng.) [hereinafter 1985 Companies Act]. The
courts have given full literal effect to this section. See, e.g., Hammond v. Prentice Bros., Ltd.,
[1920] 1 Ch. 201 (1919).
6. 1985 Companies Act, ch. 2, § 716(1). There are exceptions for lawyers, accountants,
and various other professions. Id. § 716(2). The reason for this somewhat curious provision
is the very undeveloped nature of English procedural law with respect to actions by and
against fluctuating groups of persons (i.e., the representative action). There also are acute
difficulties when unincorporated trading groups go into insolvent liquidation. These
difficulties are avoided where a business is carried on in corporate form.
7. The one exception to this is that public companies (broadly, companies that can
distribute shares to the public) must have a minimum paid-up capital of £50,000. 1985
Companies Act, ch. 1, § 118. Given that public companies are almost invariably substantial
concerns, the sum of £50,000 is insignificant. The requirement for an authorized minimum
of paid-up capital is a requirement of the Second Council Directive on Company Law 77/91,
art. 6(1), 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1.
8. See A NEW FORM OF INCORPORATION FOR SMALL FIRMS, A CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT, 1981, CMND. 8171, at 41 tbl.C.
9. [1897] App. Cas. 22 (P.C. 1896) (appeal taken from Eng.).
10. Early English company legislation required that there be more than one incorporator,
but this presented no real problem in forming the one-man company since the incorporators
could hold their shares as trustees for a single incorporator. Currently, English company law
does permit incorporation by a single person in the case of a private company. See 1985
Companies Act, ch. 1, § I (implementing the Twelfth Council Directive on Company Law,
89/667, 1989 O.J. (L395) 40).
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II.

THE SALOMON PRINCIPLE

While many of the questions raised by the hypothetical are familiar to
English practicing and academic lawyers, they are not questions which have
been addressed to any significant extent by our courts, or which counsel
would naturally raise with the court. The reason for this is relatively
straightforward: the principle in Salomon" remains the dominant principle
of English company. The company law culture of English lawyers is such
that an attempt to persuade the court to depart from the principle embodied
in the Salomon case is not likely to be made, and even if made, is not likely
to succeed. The hegemony of Salomon is so well entrenched in English law
that for most purposes it can only be effectively diluted by legislative
intervention. At the outset, a brief analysis of the Salomon decision is
needed to provide a framework for this article.
The facts in Salomon involved a common commercial transaction, the
incorporation of a business that had previously been carried on in unincorporated form.' 2 Mr. Salomon, the owner, transferred the business to "Aron
Salomon and Company, Limited" (Salomon Ltd.), a company that he had
formed. 3 The consideration paid to the company was composed of 20,001
shares and a secured debenture of £10,000.14 The other shareholders in the
Salomon Ltd.
company were Mrs. Salomon, four sons, and a daughter.
Mr.
Salomon
had been
the
debenture
in
favor
of
went into liquidation, and if
6
paid according to its priority,' there would have been nothing left for the
unsecured creditors. 7 The House of Lords (a strong court) held that
Salomon Ltd. was a separate entity from Mr. Salomon, he had entered into
perfectly valid commercial arrangement with the company, and accordingly,
the debenture was enforceable against the company. 8 By enforcing his

11. Salomon, [1897] App. Cas. at 22. The lower court decisions are reported at Broderip
v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323 (C.A. 1894). Both the first instance judge and the three judges
of the Court of Appeal held for various reasons that Mr. Salomon could not enforce his
debenture in the liquidation of Salomon Ltd. Id.
12. Salomon, [1897] App. Cas. at 23.
13. Id.
14. Id.at 24.
15. Id. at 23. At that time it was necessary to have seven shareholders. Companies Act,
1862, 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 1, § 6 (Eng.).
16. Salomon, [1897] App. Cas. at 24. Mr. Salomon had transferred the debenture, but this
has no bearing on the analysis since the assignee only would take as good a title as the assignor (Mr. Salomon); therefore, the central issue before the court was, as a matter of substance,
the right of Mr. Salomon to enforce his security in the liquidation of Salomon Ltd. and thus
gain priority over the unsecured creditors. Id.
17. Id. The debt owing to the unsecured creditors was approximately £7,733. Id.
18. Id. at 27.
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security, Mr. Salomon "scooped the pool,"' 9 and there was nothing left for
the unsecured creditors of Salomon Ltd. 0
There are a number of features of the Salomon decision that account for
its durability. First, it was fully accepted by all dealing with the case that
Mr. Salomon never intended to raise any capital from the public, and the
other shareholders had no real independence from Mr. Salomon. 1 The
judges who heard the case fully appreciated that the issue at the heart of
Salomon was the propriety of Mr. Salomon altering the legal status
of his
22
business so that he could obtain the privilege of limited liability.
Second, the commercial significance of the decision was fully appreciated
by the courts; therefore, it was not a situation where the courts may have
unwittingly let the genie out of the bottle. Lord Justice Lindley in the Court
of Appeal stated:
The appeal raises a question of very great importance, not only
to the persons immediately affected by the decision, but also to a
large number of persons who form what are called "one-man
companies." Such companies were unheard of until a comparatively
recent period, but have become very common of late years. 3
Finally, there is undoubtedly a certain lack of sophistication in the
manner in which the lower courts, who held that Mr. Salomon should not be
able to enforce his debenture, reached their conclusion. The lower courts
seemed to reason that it was never intended that corporate status could be
obtained by a person merely incorporating their business and using nominees
as the other shareholders. Where such a ploy was entered into, the company
in some way became the incorporator's agent, who as principal would be
liable for its debts under normal agency principles. It would have been

19. A.L. DIAMOND, SECURrrY OVER PROPERTY OTHER THAN LAND 6.1.2 (Department
of Trade & Indus. Consultation Document, 1986).
20. Salomon, [1897] App. Cas. at 23.
21. See, e.g., Broderip, [1895] 2 Ch.at 329 (Vaughan Williams, J., at first instance); id.
at 328 (Lindley, L.J., in the Court of Appeal).
22. Id. at 323. In the course of his judgment, Lord Justice Lindley referred to Salomon
Ltd. as a

mere device- to enable a man to carry on trade with limited liability, to incur debts
in the name of a registered company, and to sweep off the company's assets by
means of debentures which he has caused to be issued to himself in order to defeat
the claims of those who have been inprudent enough to trade with the company
without perceiving the trap which he has laid for them.
Id. at 339; see also Salomon, [1897] App. Cas. at 31, 44, 53 (Lord Halsbury, L.C., Lord
Herschell, and Lord Macnaghten, respectively, in the House of Lords.)
23. Broderip, [1895] 2 Ch. at 336; see id. at 340 (Lopes, L.J., stating, "This is a case of
very great importance.").
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preferable if the courts had formulated a more sophisticated doctrine of
subordination to cover situations where incorporators put capital into a
company in the24form of secured debt when they should have invested in the
form of equity.
II.

VEIL PIERCING

English company law does, of course, recognize the principle of piercing
the corporate veil, and examples of this abound.25 When there is fraud,26
the courts normally have no difficulty in piercing the veil. A recent example
of this is Re H and others (restraint order: realisableproperty).27 There
the court made a restraining order with respect to the property of a number
of individuals who were charged with serious tax fraud. The order also
applied to companies that they controlled. The companies appealed on the
grounds that since they had not been charged with any offense, the court had
no jurisdiction to make an order against them. On the facts, the Court of
Appeal held that the companies had been used as vehicles for the tax fraud
of their controllers, and that it was proper to "lift the corporate veil," because
the companies were being used to evade limitations imposed by law. 28 Lord
Justice Rose, giving the judgment of the court, stated:
As to the evidence, it provides a prima facie case that the
defendants control these companies; that the companies have been
used for fraud, in particular the evasion of excise duty on a large

24. English insolvency law does not have an equivalent to the U.S. principle of equitable
subordination. See, e.g., In re Carolee's Combine, Inc., 3 B.R. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
The only claims subordinated in the winding up of an insolvent company are those by
members in their "character of a member." Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 1, § 74(2)(f) (Eng.).
The courts have given this a very narrow interpretation. See, e.g., Soden v. British &
Commonwealth Holdings plc, [1996] 2 B.C.L.C. 207.
25. See generally L.C.B. GOWER, D.D. PRENTICE, B.G. PETET, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW at ch. 8 (6th ed. 1997); Murray A. Pickering, The Company as a Separate
Legal Entity, 31 MOD. L. REv. 481 (1968).
26. It is difficult to stabilize this concept. The only point that appears to be clear is that
where a company is formed for the purpose of defeating an existing contractual or proprietary
right, the court will be disposed to find fraud. See, e.g., Gilford Motor Co., Ltd. v. Home,
[1933] 1 Ch. 935 (Eng. C.A.); Jones v. Lipman, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 832 (Ch. 1961).
27. Re H (restraint order), [1996] 2 All E.R. 391 (C.A. 1996); see, e.g., Re a Company,
[1985] B.C.L.C. 333, 333 (Eng. C.A.) (court piercing the corporate veil in a situation where
a network of companies was set up to insulate the defendant's assets from any legal process).
28. Re H, [1996] 2 All E.R. at 402 (quoting Adams v. Cape Industries Pic., [1990] 1 Ch.
433, 544 (Eng. C.A. 1988)). The court did state, however, that "[a]s to the law, the general
principle remains that which was enunciated in Salomon v. Salomon & Co . .. namely that
a company duly formed and registered is a separate legal entity and must be treated like any
other independent person with its own rights and liabilities distinct from those of its
shareholders." ld. at 401.
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scale; that the defendants regard the companies as carrying on a
family business, and that company cash has benefited the defendants
in substantial amounts.29
The overall problem with veil-piercing jurisprudence is that it is a
wilderness of isolated precedents, or to put it slightly differently, the cases
hunt in packs of two with the respective pack members going off in different
directions.3" A search of the specialist company law reports Butterworths
Company Law Cases, which was started in 1983, indicates that there are only
thirteen cases in which the issue of piercing the corporate veil was raised,
and in only one was the plea successful. 3'
Two recent decisions, Adams v. Cape Industries Plc.3 2 and Re Polly
3 3 illustrate
Peck Internationalplc (in administration)
the iron grip that the
Salomon principle has on English company law. The facts in Adams,
somewhat simplified, were as follows. Default judgments had been given by
a Texas federal court against two English companies, Cape and Capasco,3 4
in connection with asbestosis claims. Proceedings were commenced in the
United Kingdom to enforce the judgment. English courts will recognize a
foreign court as competent to give an in personam judgment against a person,
capable of enforcement against that person in the United Kingdom, where,
inter alia, that person was resident in the foreign jurisdiction at the time the
action is commenced against him.35 In order to show residence on the part
of a company, it is necessary that it has a place of business in the foreign
jurisdiction, or that it carried on business there through an agent who has
36
power conduct business on its behalf.
It was argued that the English companies were present in the United
States through the companies that marketed and sold the asbestos. The
asbestos was marketed and sold through a wholly owned Illinois subsidiary
of Cape, N.A.A.C., until 1978 when it was put into liquidation. 37 The court
found that "N.A.A.C.'s dominant business purpose was to assist and
encourage sales in the United States of asbestos mined by the Cape

29. Id. at 402.
30. See generally GOWER ET AL., supra note 25.
31. Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd., [1993] B.C.L.C. 480 (Q.B. 1992). For further
discussion, see infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
32. [1990] 1 Ch. 433 (Eng. C.A. 1988).
33. [1996] 2 All E.R. 433 (Ch. 1995).
34. The latter being a subsidiary of the former and both being part of the Cape Group of
companies.
35. Adams, [1990] 1 Ch. at 523.
36. Id. at 524 (This statement is greatly simplified.).
37. Id. at 434.
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subsidiaries. 38 The object of the liquidation of N.A.A.C. was stated by the
lower court judge to be as follows:
The minutes [of the board meeting of Cape at which the decision to
wind up N.A.A.C. was taken] do not state but there can really be no
doubt but that the decision to wind up N.A.A.C. was taken in order
to try and avoid the danger of an argument that under English law
Cape's interest in N.A.A.C.'s United States business sufficed to give
[the U.S. court] .. .jurisdiction over Cape.39

Cape still needed to market its asbestos in the United States, and it continued
to do so through an Illinois company, C.P.C., which was set up by the
expresident of N.A.A.C.4 °
Two arguments were put forward to show that the defendant companies
were present in the United States initially through N.A.A.C. and then through
C.P.C. These were referred to respectively by the Court of Appeal as "the
'single economic unit' argument" and "the 'corporate veil' point."'"
A.

The Single Economic Unit Argument

The plaintiffs did not argue that the parent-subsidiary relationship would
automatically give rise to a single economic unit, which would justify the
court in treating the defendant companies as being present in the United
States because of the presence of the subsidiary, N.A.A.C. in the United
States.42 Rather, the plaintiffs argued that the subsidiary should be treated
as an integral economic part of the Cape group of companies, because of the
degree of control which was exercise over it, with the consequence that its
presence in the United States could constitute the presence there of other
group members.43 The court found that there was a significant degree of
overall supervision of the affairs of N.A.A.C. by its English parent: its level
of expenses, expenditure, business policy, borrowing, and dividends were all
controlled by Cape.' Despite this high degree of commercial control, the
38. Id. at 472. There had been earlier proceedings involving asbestosis cl*aims with
respect to which Cape had submitted to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. Id. at 434.
39. Id. at 450.
40. Id. at 538-39. The marketing was not done directly by Cape but by a Liechtenstein
company the shares in which were held in trust for one of the Cape group of companies. The
court held that this company was merely a facade and had no independent existence. Id. at
434. However, this had no bearing on the jurisdictional issue.
41. Id. at 539.
42. Id. at 474-75. The lower court judge was willing to hold that if N.A.A.C. had been
a branch rather than a company, Cape would have been present in the United States. Id. at
474.
43. Id. at 474-75.
44. Id. at 538.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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court at first instance and on appeal held that the separate legal existence of
the companies had to be recognized and the fact of residence by the
subsidiary, N.A.A.C., could not give rise to a finding of residence in the
United States by the parent, Cape.4" It cited with approval the dictum of
Lord Justice Goff in Bank of Tokyo Ltd. v. Karoon (Note):
"[Counsel] suggested beguilingly that it would be technical for us to
distinguish between parent and subsidiary company in this context;
economically, he said, they were one. But we are concerned not
the two is, in
with economics but the law. The distinction between
46
law, fundamental and cannot here be bridged.
After finding that its wholly owned subsidiary was not part of the single
economic entity composed by the group, it was inevitable that the successor
company to the subsidiary, C.P.C., in which Cape had no shareholdings,
would not be considered as forming part of a single economic entity so as to
render Cape, or any other companies in the Cape group, resident in the
United States.
As stated above, the liquidation of N.A.A.C. and the formation of C.P.C.
were designed to deal with the Cape group's exposure to the asbestosis
claims. On this the Court of Appeal stated:
If a company chooses to arrange the affairs of its group in such a
way that the business carried on in a particular foreign country is the
business of its subsidiary and not its own, it is, in our judgment,
entitled to do so. Neither in this class of case nor in any other class
of case is it open to this court to disregard the principle of Salomon
v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd... merely because it considers it just so
to do.47
.

What also is of interest in Adams is that the Court of Appeal referred to
Bulova Watch Co. v. K Hattori & Co. 41 where the U.S. District Court held
that it had jurisdiction over a Japanese parent corporation that was expanding
into the U.S. market through the use of subsidiaries on the grounds that the
parent company was carrying on business in New York.49 However, this
was to no avail. For the Court of Appeal, there was a difference between a

45. Id. at 539.

46. Id. at 538 (quoting Bank of Tokyo Ltd. v. Karoon, [1987] App. Cas. 45, 64 (1984))
(alteration in original).
47. Id. at 537.

48. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. N.Y. 1981).
49. Weinstein, C.J., stated that "these subsidiaries almost by definition are doing for their
parent what their parent would otherwise have to do on its own." Id. at 1342.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss3/3
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situation where "a company itself trades in a foreign country and the case
where it trades in a foreign country through a subsidiary, whose activities it
has full power to control."' In the latter situation, there is no presence on
the part of the parent so as to make it amenable to the jurisdiction of the
courts where the subsidiary carried on business.
B.

The Corporate Veil Point

The corporate veil point was a more conventional approach to the
problem. The Court of Appeal accepted that one of the purposes of
liquidating N.A.A.C. and carrying on business through C.P.C. was to reduce
"by any lawful means available to it the risk ...[of being] subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States courts."'" The court held on established
authorities that it would pierce the corporate veil where the company was in
some sense a "facade," a phrase of no real clear meaning.52 On the facts,
it found that C.P.C. had a sufficient independent existence so that it could not
be considered a facade of Cape. 3 More importantly, it was argued that the
court should pierce the corporate veil where a company had been formed for
the purpose of evading "such rights of relief as third parties may in the future
acquire."' To this the Court of Appeal replied:
[W]e do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift
the corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the
member of a corporate group merely because the corporate structure
has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in
respect of particular future activities of the group (and correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on another
member of the group rather than the defendant company. Whether
or not this is desirable, the right to use a55 corporate structure in this
manner is inherent in our corporate law.
Re Polly Peck International6 is in many ways a more significant
example of the strict application of the Salomon principle, and it is difficult
to imagine it reflecting the law in many other jurisdictions. Polly Peck
International Plc (Polly Peck) went into administration in October 1990."7

50. Adams, [1990] 1 Ch. at 536.
51. Id. at 541.
52. Id. at 542-43.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 544.
55. Id.
56. [1996] 2 All E.R. 433 (Ch. 1995).
57. Id. at 433. Administration was introduced for the first time by Part II of the
Insolvency Act 1986. See Dan Prentice et al., Administration:Part II of the Insolvency Act
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It had incorporated a wholly owned Cayman island company, PPIF, as a
special purpose financial vehicle to obtain funding for the Polly Peck group
of companies.5 8 PPIF made a series of bond issues to banks totalling £485
million. 9 The bond issues were guaranteed by Polly Peck, and the
proceeds of the issues were on-loaned to Polly Peck.6 °
To understand the relevance of the Salomon principle for the matter in
dispute in Re Polly Peck International,an explanation of some. aspects of
English insolvency law is needed. 6' The principle of double proof in
English insolvency law precludes more than one proof with respect to the
same debt. If there were no such rule, a creditor could maximize his return
on the insolvency of his debtor by persuading his debtor to enter into
contracts with several persons with respect to the same debt so that on the
insolvency of the debtor all could prove. 62 The most common situation
where the principle of double proof operates is where a person guarantees the
debt of a company that goes into insolvent liquidation. In this situation it is
not possible both for the creditor to prove in the insolvency for the principal
debt and for the surety to prove with respect to the company's contingent
liability to indemnify the surety with respect to his liability to the creditor on
the guarantee. The right of the surety to be indemnified is merely the
reflection of the debt owed by the company to the creditor, and in this
situation, it is only the creditor who can prove.63
Both the bondholders, under Polly Peck's guarantee of PPIF's liability
under the bonds, and PPIF, with respect to the debt owed to it in connection
with the on-loans of the bond proceeds to Polly Peck, submitted claims in the
administration of Polly Peck.64 The order made in the administration65
provided that the principle of double proof would apply to creditor claims,

1986, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
INSOLvENCY LAW at ch. 5 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994). It enables, inter alia, a company in
financial distress to be restructured. Id. It is compared, wrongly it is submitted, with Chapter
11 of the American Bankruptcy Code. Id.
58. Re Polly Peck Int'l, [1996] 2 All E.R. at 433.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. As a matter of English nomenclature, insolvency refers to company liquidations,
whereas the term bankruptcy is confined to individuals.
62. See In Re Oriental Commercial Bank, ex parte European Bank, [1871] 7 L.R.-Ch. 99,
103-04 (Ch. App.).
63. The surety could of course pay off the creditor and prove in the company's liquidation
with respect to the amount owed to him under his right of indemnity. There would still be
only one proof, namely, that of the surety. See generally Barclays Bank Ltd. v. T.O.S.G. Trust
Fund Ltd., [1984] App. Cas. 626 (1983) (appeal taken from Eng.) for a discussion of the
principle of double proof.
64. Re Polly Peck Int'l, [1996] 2 All E.R. at 433.
65. Id. at 447. It is common where an administration order is made with respect to an
insolvent company for the court order to provide that the distribution of the company's assets
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and the administrators sought the court's guidance as to whether or not this
precluded both the bondholders and PPIF from simultaneously lodging proof
with respect to their respective claims."6
Counsel for the administrators argued that as a matter of substance the
debt of PPIF to the bondholders was the debt of Polly Peck, and there was
therefore no independent liability of Polly Peck to PPIF with respect to the
funds that it had allegedly on-loaned to Polly Peck.67 He argued that there
were two distinct conceptual routes by which one could arrive at this
conclusion. 68 Either PPIF could simply be treated as the nominee of Polly
Peck in making the bond issue, or alternatively, Polly Peck and PPIF could
be treated as a single economic entity so that there was in reality only one
debt owed by the group. 69 The factors justifying these approaches were
argued (and accepted as existing by the court) as follows:
(i) PPIF was incorporated solely for the purpose of the bond issues;
(ii) it had no separate, independent management; (iii) it had a very
small paid-up capital; (iv) it did not pay the costs of the transactions
and could not have done so; (v) it had no normal bank account and
no separate financial records (in practice PPI [Polly Peck] saw to
everything and acted as PPIF's banker and bookkeeper); (vi) the
terms of the on-loan were not independently negotiated, did not serve
any commercial purpose and in any case were never finally agreed,
nor was the 1/4% turn paid otherwise than as a paper transaction;
and (vii) no lender could or would have relied on PPIF's covenant,
as opposed to PPI's [Polly Peck] (which could substitute itself as
principal debtor if it got the approval of the principal paying agents).
In short, Mr. Kosmin [counsel for the administrators] submits
that PPIF had only a nominal role in the arrangements, and that as
a matter of substance PPI [Polly Peck] should be recognised as
having borrowed direct from the original bondholders, so depriving
the on-loan of any legal significance (or indeed existence).7"
Both conceptual routes argued by counsel for the administrators finding
that the loans made to PPIF were in fact made to Polly Peck were rejected
by the court.7 The agency argument, that is, that PPIF in making the bond

should be on the same basis as if the company were in liquidation, thus providing for a
notional liquidation before the company goes into formal liquidation.
66. Id. at 435.

67. Id. at 443.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 446-47.
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issue was the agent of Polly Peck, was rejected on the very formalistic
grounds that the documentation relating to the bond issues made it clear that
the bond issues were those of PPIF and not Polly Peck.72 The court also
held that any agency relationship could not be inferred "simply because a
subsidiary company has a small paid-up capital and has a board of directors
all or most of whom are also directors or senior executives of its holding
company."73 The single economic entity argument advanced by counsel for
the applicants was simply that PPIF and Polly Peck, along with other
companies in the group, should be treated as a single legal entity because
they were a "closely-integrated group of companies."7 4 This argument also
failed. The companies, despite the degree of economic integration, were
separate legal entities. The court applied what purported to be a substantive
test in determining whether or not companies were separate entities, but
there, "substance means legal substance, not economic substance."7
IV.

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

Before examining some of the reasons for the English courts' continued
adherence to the strict Salomon principle, the issue of "successor liability"
needs to be examined. It would be presumptuous for the present author to
attempt to delineate the concept of successor liability in U.S. law. However,
a paradigm case will be taken as a backdrop for analyzing the English law.
One variant of successor liability is the "mere continuation doctrine." Under
this doctrine, a successor company that is a separate legal entity is made
liable for the obligations of its predecessor where "the successor has the same
stockholders as the predecessor and conducts the same business with the
same management, facilities, employees, products, and trade names."7 6 In
other words, all that has changed is the legal form; as a matter of commercial
substance, there is identity. In this situation, which presents the most clearcut case for a doctrine of successor liability, there is no serious possibility
that under English law the successor company could be made liable for the
72. Id. at 446.
73. Id. at 445. There is no objection in principle to a subsidiary acting as an agent for

its parent, but this relationship cannot simply be inferred from the parent/subsidiary status,
something more is required.
74. Id. at 447.

75. Id. at 448. Another case that shows the court's unwillingness to pierce the corporate
veil even where issues of basic company law principle are involved is Acatos & Hutcheson
pic v. Watson, [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 218 (Ch. 1994) (Eng.). It is a principle of English company

law that except under stringent conditions, a company may not purchase its own shares. Id.
at 220. Nevertheless, in the Acatos decision, the court held that a company could purchase
another company whose sole asset was shares in the purchasing company. Id. at 224-25. The
court refused to pierce the corporate veil. Id.
76. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of the EnterpriseDoctrine Corporate Successorship in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 371 (1996).
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debts of its predecessor.77 No doubt, if both companies remain in existence,
the courts might be willing to pierce the corporate veil.7" But this very
uncertain doctrine will be of no avail where the predecessor company has
gone into liquidation.
In English company law, there is a procedure for reviving companies that
have been liquidated,79 but it is only of value if the company that is being
revived has assets that were not distributed by the liquidator."0 Also, if
there has been a distribution of assets to contributories, that is, members, it
would appear that there is no mechanism whereby the overpaid contributories
should disgorge in favor of the underpaid creditors.8 '
Thus, if one were to take our hypothetical problem, the issue in
paragraph C is not one that can be raised with any serious chance of success
under English law. For the purposes of argument, assuming that Explodewin
and Explodeco were English companies, an English court would simply not
hold the former liable in damages for defective products manufactured and
sold by the latter. Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd. 2 is a good example,
and one of the few that illustrates the operation of English law in this regard.
In Creasey, Eric Creasey had been employed by Welwyn Ltd. (Welwyn),
a motor retailer, and claimed to have been unfairly dismissed. 3
Breachwood Motors Ltd. (Motors) also was a motor retailer, and its
shareholders and directors were Mr. Ford and Mr. Seaman. 84 Ford and
Seaman also were the sole shareholders of Welwyn. 5 Welwyn got into
financial difficulties. It transferred its assets to Motors, and Motors paid off
Welwyn's debts but made no provision for its contingent liability to Creasey
with respect to any damages claim he might possess with respect to his unfair

77. If the successor could not be made liable in this situation, it would difficult to
envisage how liability could arise in less compelling circumstances.
78. This normally would not be necessary if the principles of company law were observed,

that is, the predecessor corporation has been paid for the sale of its assets and presumably is
therefore in a position to satisfy claims against it.
79. 1985 Companies Act, ch. 6, §§ 653, 656; see GOWER ET AL., supra note 25, at 84885.
80. The type of situation where this can occur is where it is discovered after the
liquidation that the company had an insurance policy covering an insurable loss of which
policy the liquidator was ignorant.
81. Butler v. Broadhead, [1975] 1 Ch. 97 (1973); LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH

586-87 (4th ed. 1993).
82. [1993] B.C.L.C. 480 (Q.B. 1992). The decision in the Adams case can be seen as
involving successor liability, in that case the successor liability being that of C.P.C. for the
debts of N.A.A.C; see also In re Baglan Hall Colliery Co., [1870] 5 L.R.-Ch. 346 (Ch. App.
1870).
83. Creasey, [1993] B.C.L.C. at 482.
JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION

84. Id.
85. Id.
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dismissal by Welwyn. 6 Creasey eventually obtained a default judgment
against Welwyn for damages for unfair dismissal.8 7 Creasey sought to have
Motors joined as a party to the proceedings against Welwyn which was
insolvent, 8 so that Motors could satisfy the judgment for damages. The
argument was akin to a successor liability argument, which looked particularly compelling in the light of the judge's finding of facts. The court stated:
The facts can be summarised shortly: (1) The contract was with
Welwyn, and at the date when Welwyn ceased to trade (30 November 1988) Welwyn had a contingent liability to Mr Creasey for
damages for breach of contract, contingent on Mr Creasey obtaining
judgment establishing such liability. (2) On 1 December 1988
Motors took over all Welwyn's assets and its business... under the
same trade name with the benefit of Welwyn's goodwill and
customers. (3) That take-over of Welwyn's assets was carried out
without regard to the separate entity of Welwyn and the interests of
its creditors, especially Mr Creasey. (4) As a practical matter Motors
had to pay off the liabilities of Welwyn (except the contingent and
later actual liability to Mr Creasey) in order to carry on the business
at 36 Brownfields, 9 and Motors did so. (5) As a result of the
actions of Mr Ford, Mr Seaman and Motors, Mr Creasey finds
himself with a judgment against Welwyn, an insolvent company, the
assets of which they have removed to Motors, a company which
refuses to meet any part of the judgment, and which does not even
offer to return the assets or their value to Welwyn. 9°
It was argued that under English company law, there is a presumption
that a company's liabilities, which include its contingent liabilities, are
transferred when the company sells its undertaking as a going concern.9 '
The court held that the transfer of a company's undertaking to another
company with the same directors and shareholders did not transfer the
liabilities of the former to the latter.92 However, the court in Creasey was
willing to pierce the corporate veil on the grounds that the affairs of Welwyn

86. Id. at 483.
87. Id. at 484.
88. Id. at 483. Welwyn had been struck off the register of companies pursuant to section
692 of the 1985 Companies Act. Id. at 484. This is a much used procedure that enables the
Registrar of Companies to strike moribund companies off the register without proceeding by
means of a formal liquidation.
89. This was the location from which W Ltd. carried on its business. Id. at 482.
90. Id. at 485.
9 1. Id. at 486. This proposition was allegedly the position under Scots law. See I GOREBROWNE ON COMPANIES § 1.4.1, at 1.007 & n.1 (A.J. Boyle ed., 44th ed. 1986).
92. Creasey, [1993] B.C.L.C. at 489-90.
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and Motors had been commingled to such an extent that Motors should be
liable to Creasey for the debt owed by Welwyn.93
V. CORPORATE GROUPS
English law does not, to any significant extent, deviate from the Salomon
principle. There are a number of reasons for this. One of the reasons why
English law is unwilling to pierce the corporate veil or to develop a more
sophisticated doctrine of enterprise liability relates to its treatment of
corporate groups.
There is no exhaustive empirical survey of the phenomenon of groups in
the United Kingdom,94 but it is clear from the surveys that have been
conducted that it is a widespread phenomenon. Thus, R. I. Tricker, in
surveying the group structure of companies within The imes 1000 top U.K.
industrial quoted companies lying in the 1-100 and 401-500 size bands, came
up with the following figures:
No. of
companies
in the sample

Rank in
Times 1000

Total No.
Subsidiaries

Average No.
Subsidiaries

Range

44

1-50

10,127

230.16

5-858

39

51-100

4,083

104.69

2-259

35

400-450

1,252

35.77

1-211

26

451-500

665

25.57

2-74

16,127

111.99

144

Table I

Total and average number of susidlaries in large groups, ranked by
company size"

The top fifty companies have more than 10,000 subsidiaries with the
arithmetical average of 230. However, this survey fails to present a complete
picture of the group phenomenon because many unlisted, private companies

also make use of the group structure.
Coupled with this, it is not strictly accurate to say that the United
93. Id. at 492.
94. See generally Dan Prentice, A Survey of the Law Relatingto Corporate Groups in the
United Kingdom, in GRouPs OF COMPANIES IN THE EEC 279 (Eddy Wymeersch ed., 1992).

95. R.I. TRICKER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 56 tbl.1 (1984) (Source: Corporate Policy
Group Study based on 1981/82 data).
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Kingdom does not have a law of corporate groups. The following statement
made with respect to the law of corporate groups in the member states of the
European Community is certainly applicable to the United Kingdom.
This [that is, the definition of a group] is not a question solely
for accounting law - labour law, tax law, competition law,
bankruptcy law, all to a greater or lesser extent, have their own
definition of groups in each Member State.... [I]t would appear
that in this matter, legal science is suffering from an excess of
quantity rather than from any shortage.96
This is significant because the legislature has intervened to deal with
various issues relating to corporate groups. As a result, English courts
consider that their function in formulating any overarching principle of
enterprise liability is greatly circumscribed. The courts, even the House of
Lords, are reluctant to intervene in a matter that has received legislative
attention, even where that attention is arguably defective. 97 As the group
situation presents the most compelling situation for departing from the strict
application of the Salomon principle,9" it is not difficult to appreciate why
the courts will not depart from it in other circumstances.
It also is clear that English law considers risk shifting by use of the
corporate form as perfectly legitimate. This policy was accepted early on by
the courts. In In re Baglan Hall Colliery Ltd., the owners of a colliery that
they had not been working successfully decided to change it into a limited
liability company in order to avoid the risk of incurring liability. 99 The
Court of Appeal, held that the owners had not done anything inappropriate
since it was "the policy of the Companies Act to enable this to be done."'"
The policy of risk shifting has never been seriously challenged. For
example, in the case of a voluntary creditor, such as a bank that provides
financing, it can be argued that the creditors accept the risk associated with

96. Michel Petite, The Conditions for Consolidation Under the 7th Company Law

Directive, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 81, 84 (1984).
97. A good example of this is provided by the recent case of Westdeutsche Landesbank
Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council, where a majority of the House of Lords

refused to award compound interest on damages even though the "strength of the moral claim"
was recognized. [1996] 2 All E.R. 961, 999. Their reason for doing so was that Parliament
had addressed this issue on two occasions (1934 and 1981) and had conferred on the courts
jurisdiction to grant only simple interest on damages. Id.
98. For example, it does not involve a complete jettisoning of the principle of limited
liability because the shareholders in the parent company normally would still benefit from it.
99. In re Baglan Hall Colliery, [1870] 5 L.R.-Ch. at 346-47. "The owners went on
working the colliery, not very successfully, and then determined to form a limited company,
in order to avoid incurring further personal liability." Id. at 356.
100. Id. at 356.
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limited liability by voluntarily dealing with those companies.', Voluntary
creditors can protect their interests either by adjusting the price to reflect the
enhanced risk or by obtaining security. However, these risk-minimizing
strategies are not available to involuntary creditors. There are a number of
reasons why the plight of involuntary creditors has not produced a significant
challenge to the policy of risk shifting in the United Kingdom. They include:
(1) compulsory insurance (industrial accidents/traffic victims) entails that the
interests of many involuntary creditors are protected; (2) employees who have
to extend credit to corporate employers are given, up to a limited amount,
priority claims for unpaid renumeration in insolvency; 2 and (3) small
trade creditors, who could be viewed as involuntary creditors, lack the
cohesion to constitute a viable lobby group for change or, alternatively, their
that these can be written off
claims individually are for such small amounts
3
business.
doing
of
cost
minimis
de
a
as
Finally, there is a strong principle of stare decisis in the United Kingdom,
and even the House of Lords exercises a very limited jurisdiction to depart
Judicial activism or the perception by the
from its previous rulings.'"
court that in appropriate circumstances, it can perform a quasi-legislative role,
is not a characteristic of English courts. This again further entrenches the
binding effect of precedent.'0 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is the hundredth anniversary of the Salomon case in 1997. It is rightly
seen as a landmark decision in English company law. It has proven
remarkably durable, and it is hard to think of another nineteenth century
English decision that has remained so unaffected by the passage of time. It
also is interesting that there has been little criticism of the Salomon principle
and little demand for its modification either judicially or legislatively. On
current form, the Salomon principle may endure for another hundred years.

101. A company's name must indicate that the liability of its members is limited. 1985
Companies Act, ch. 2, § 25(1).
102. Insolvency Act 1986, ch. 10, § 386, sched. 6 (Eng.).

103.
relieve
104.
105.

This may merely be an example of the old adage that for a fraudster it is it safer to
five million persons of £1 each rather than to relieve one person of £5,000,000.
See generally ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDs (1982).
The contrast between English and U.S. judicial techniques is developed in PATRICK

S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW at chs.

4, 20 (1991).
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